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In recent years, the philosophy of Ludwig Boltzmann has become a point of 
interest within the field of History of Philosophy of Science. Attention has 
centred around Boltzmann’s philosophical considerations connected to his 
defence of atomism in physics. In analysing these considerations, several 
scholars have attributed a pragmatist stance to Boltzmann. In this paper, I want 
to argue that, whatever pragmatist traits may be found in Boltzmann’s diverse 
writings, his defence of atomism in physics can not be analysed this way. In 
other words, I wish to show that he did not defend atomism as “preferable for 
its practical virtues”, as has been alleged.1 On the contrary, Boltzmann 
considered the atomist picture to be indispensable—more precisely, an 
indispensable prerequisite for making the application of continuous differential 
equations an understandable enterprise.  
Boltzmann’s ideas related to this line of reasoning are scattered across his 
writings. Thus, what I label his ‘mathematical argument’ for atomism is a rather 
loosely arranged set of views. Additionally to the aim formulated above, it is a 
second objective of this paper to bring together various historical details 
relating to the mathematical argument and find a reading that is coherent in 
itself and with Boltzmann’s other philosophical opinions. A third aim is then (at 
the end of the paper) to sketch an important limitation of Boltzmann’s thus 
reconstructed case for atomism. 
1. THE VIRTUE OF ATOMISM 
As a beginning, let me remind you of one of Boltzmann’s better-known essays 
on this subject, his ‘On the Indispensability of Atomism in Natural Science’ 
(first published in 1897). My thesis that Boltzmann argued for the 
indispensability of atomism and not merely for its pragmatic superiority is on a 
very superficial level reinforced by the title of the essay. But on a deeper level, 
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the argument in this central essay is not so unambiguous. Let me, without 
further quotations, sketch a very obvious way to read that argument. 
The argument is mainly directed against the mathematical 
phenomenologists, who demand the abandonment of atomist principles and 
their replacement by the idea of a physical continuum. The continuum idea in 
question is the mathematical continuum concept as it is manifested in the 
application of real analysis in theoretical physics. However, Boltzmann claims, 
the phenomenologists thereby obscure the discontinuous foundations of the 
continuum concept underlying the differential calculus, which derives from the 
mathematical concept of limit. This concept, if applied to physical reality, must 
from Boltzmann’s point of view be understood as follows: the limit of a 
function is established by increasing a certain number (of particles, of sections 
into which an interval is divided) until further increment of that number would 
not have any “noticeable” influence on the result any more. So, for Boltzmann, 
to forget about these foundations and take the differential equations themselves 
as the most straightforward representation of reality (as the mathematical 
phenomenologists do) means only to make an additional assumption: the 
assumption, that is, that however much our means of observation improves and 
however more subtle the differences “noticeable” for us become, we will never 
chance upon a difference between the measured facts and the magnitudes given 
by mathematical (infinitary) limits. For Boltzmann, atomism is the position 
which does not make that additional assumption, and since he holds the 
assumption to be totally unwarranted, the mathematical phenomenologists go 
further beyond the observable facts than the atomists do. Thus, atomism is the 
most natural stance for a scientist applying the differential calculus to nature. 
So far, Boltzmann’s reasoning provides an argument that atomism is 
preferable with respect to the background assumption that the scientific image 
should contain as few arbitrary elements as possible. This rhetoric is, of course, 
designed to defeat his scientific adversaries Mach, Ostwald et al. with their own 
weapons. However, I must concede, it does not add up to an argument for the 
indispensability of atomism, because ‘making fewer arbitrary assumptions’ is a 
feature that may make a theoretical picture preferable, but not automatically 
indispensable.  
2. THE INDISPENSABILITY OF ATOMISM 
Fortunately, Boltzmann’s argument contains a further, though less obvious and 
less clear element. The essay discussed so far also contains claims to the effect 
that the idea of a continuum in nature would be incomprehensible without an 
atomistic foundation: 
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Atomism seems inseparable from the concept of the continuum. The reason why 
Laplace, Poisson, Cauchy and others started from atomistic considerations is evidently 
that in those days scientists were as yet more clearly conscious that differential 
equations are merely symbols for atomistic conceptions so that they felt a stronger need 
to make the latter simple.2 
Here it is no longer ‘atomism vs. the continuum’ but ‘no continuum without 
atomism’. Contrary to the aforementioned line of reasoning, where the 
continuum picture was just like the atomist picture but with one more arbitrary 
and unnecessary assumption, it is now claimed to be in need of an atomistic 
interpretation. 
Boltzmann returned to this leitmotif many times. The continuum itself is 
thereby taken to represent the idea of actually infinite divisibility. But in 
physics, infinity can only be viewed as a “Grenzübergang,” a limit-transition.3 
This is how he represented this core idea in his 1904 address to the Scientific 
Congress in St. Louis:  
[W]e cannot define infinity in any other way than as the limit of ever growing finite 
magnitudes, at least nobody so far has been able to establish an intelligible concept of 
infinity in any other way.4 
For Boltzmann, this implied that it is indispensable to understand not only the 
infinite in terms of the finite, but also the continuum in terms of the discrete. 
Let’s turn again to the ‘Indispensability’ essay of 1897, where he states the 
following: 
Do not imagine that by means of the word continuum or the writing down of a 
differential equation, you have acquired a clear concept of the continuum. On closer 
scrutiny the differential equation is merely the expression for the fact that one must first 
imagine a finite number; this is the first prerequisite, only then is the number to grow 
until its further growth has no further influence.5 
Obviously, this view requires clarifications. Analysis as applied in physics 
evidently presupposes the actual continuum of real numbers. It is essential that 
for any monotone and bounded sequence, the set of real numbers contains the 
actual limit towards which the sequence converges, and not just enormously 
many elements of the sequence until further growth is not “noticeable” 
anymore. (Otherwise, real analysis wouldn’t be Cauchy complete.) It is 
therefore even characteristic for real analysis that it can not be reduced to the 
finite in the way Boltzmann envisages. 
Is he thus suggesting that the mathematical continuum is somehow an 
unjustified concept and that science should distance itself from real analysis? 
Fortunately not. Nowhere does he make this suggestion, and he goes on to 
apply real analysis like any other physicist. How then are we to understand his 
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assertion that in physics, we have to conceive of the continuous differential 
equations as “symbols for atomistic conceptions”? 
To get further elucidation on this, one has to turn to the lecture course on 
Natural Philosophy that Boltzmann gave in the winter term of 1903/04.6 There, a 
difference between Boltzmann’s philosophy of pure and applied mathematics 
becomes apparent. He naturally introduces infinitary concepts of pure 
mathematics and even calls it a “legitimate claim” that mathematics be in 
principle in a position to grasp the infinite and the “actually continuous”.7 But 
when he turns to a closer inspection of infinitary mathematics as explicated by 
Cantor’s set theory, he makes it clear that this amounts to no more than a 
“game with concepts”.8 As I will lay out in a little more detail in section 4, 
Boltzmann thought that such merely conceptual constructions, not directly 
modelled on experience, were inadvertently fallible and ambiguous if applied 
to reality. Thus, to preserve certitude of scientific inference, applied analysis has 
to be given a finite, discontinuous interpretation. (As Boltzmann wrote in 1897, 
the “practical utility” of infinitary methods are not to be called into question, 
but they are “epistemologically inferior to atomistic conceptions”.9) 
While a more extensive treatment of Boltzmann’s reasons for this claim will 
have to wait for a moment, we may for now retain the following moral as a 
tentative interpretation of the claim that “differential equations are merely 
symbols for atomistic conceptions”: there is nothing wrong with the actual 
mathematical continuum as such, it is only in its application to natural 
phenomena that it has to be accompanied by an atomistic conception of the 
underlying reality (in order to prevent ambiguity). Such an atomistically 
understood reality can of course not be accurately reflected by continuous 
differential equations. But descriptions in terms of differential equations can be 
seen as symbols for atomistic conceptions in so far as they can serve to give us 
good approximations to the truths of an indefinitely (but not infinitely) fine-
grained discontinuous reality. In fact, Boltzmann suggested just this picture 
when he spoke of a possible discontinuity of time during his exposition of the 
general laws of motion in his lectures on mechanics: 
Perhaps our formulae are only very closely approximate expressions for average values 
that can be constructed from much finer elements and are not strictly speaking 
differentiable. As to that, however, there are so far no indications from experience.10 
This leads us to another point of clarification. The atomism at stake in the 
debate around the turn of the century was, of course, an atomism of matter. Yet 
Boltzmann’s argument is directed against continuous concepts as such and thus 
promotes a more thoroughgoing atomism, including discontinuous time. 
Boltzmann mostly buries this aspect in the footnotes. In an extensive footnote to 
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the ‘Indispensability’ essay, he imagines a world of enormously many packed 
spheres that evolve through discontinuous time. He concludes: 
If it were possible to find such a picture that showed more comprehensive agreement 
than ordinary atomism, the picture would thereby be justified. Thus the view of atoms 
as material points and of forces as functions of their distance is no doubt provisional but 
must at present be retained failing a better one.11 
In short: even atomistic physics as practised by Boltzmann is not only 
approximative (because it still applies continuous equations to a discontinuous 
reality) but also provisional (because it falls short of a thoroughly atomistic 
conception and remains restricted to an atomism of matter). 
Let me summarise the picture that emerges from the interpretation I have 
sketched in this section: without an atomistic conception of the underlying 
reality, continuous differential equations are rooted in mere games with 
concepts and remain fallible and ambiguous. Therefore, atomism is 
indispensable for physical science if it is to be saved from ambiguity. There still 
remains a lot to say about why Boltzmann held these convictions. Before I turn 
to that question, I wish to respond to a possible objection. 
3. ATOMISM: PREFERABLE OR INDISPENSABLE? 
My claim that Boltzmann really wanted to argue for the indispensability of 
atomism depreciates the other argument that can be inferred from the 1897 
essay, i.e. that atomism is preferable, on the ground of its making fewer arbitrary 
assumptions, as explained in section 1, to a mere rhetorical device. An obvious 
objection to my analysis arises: Why should one accept the suggestion that it’s 
the argument for preferability which has only rhetorical character, while the 
indispensability of atomism for unambiguous reasoning about the physical 
continuum constitutes a genuine and fundamental argument of Boltzmann’s? 
Could it not equally well be just the other way round, so that Boltzmann’s 
indispensability considerations turn out to be a rhetorical over-intensification of 
his plea for preferability? 
This objection would in fact fit in well with a very common account of 
Boltzmann’s philosophical activity in the 1890’s. This account stresses the fact 
that during that time, Boltzmann was facing an increasing influence of anti-
metaphysical opposition to the (trans-conscious) reality of atoms, brought up 
by Mach, Ostwald and others. This threatened the core of his physical work and 
thinking: kinetic theory and physical discontinuity. Therefore, it is often said, he 
adopted a series of diverse and sometimes incompatible philosophical 
positions, with the one and only aim of being in the strongest possible position 
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to defend the core of his scientific work: atomism.12 This account is sometimes 
applied to his picture theory of scientific representation and to his philosophy 
of language sounding proposals to cleanse science of ‘meaningless’ 
metaphysical questions. Extending this to his indispensability idea seems to 
add up to a nice objection to my reading: the talk of the indispensability of 
atomism for our understanding of the physical continuum would then merely 
be the strongest possible rhetorical device, which Boltzmann pragmatically 
adopted for the purpose of defending his research programme. 
My belief that this is not the case and that there is more to his 
indispensability considerations is based on my account of how Boltzmann came 
to think about the indispensability of atomism in the first place. The idea that in 
physics, infinity can only be viewed as a limit-transition, presented itself to 
Boltzmann at least 20 years before the ‘Indispensability’ essay was published. 
As I will now explain, I believe that it emerged directly from the concrete 
conceptual problems of his own research in theoretical physics. 
Whereas usually Boltzmann is said to have ignored philosophy before the 
mid-1880’s, the indispensability idea surfaces as early as 1877, in his famous 
paper on the relation between the second theorem of thermodynamics and the 
theory of probability. It contains a proof of the theorem which we today call 
Boltzmann’s relation, S = k log W. This important result relates the concept of 
entropy (S) of a gas in a certain macrostate to the probability (W) of that 
macrostate. This probability is in turn defined via the relative number of 
equiprobable microstates corresponding to each respective macrostate. The 
microstates in question are energy distributions among the molecules of the 
gas. However, since the kinetic energy that each molecule can assume is a 
continuous quantity, there are of course infinitely many possible energy 
distributions corresponding to each macrostate. Therefore, the rough and 
slightly incorrect characterisation of the concepts involved which I have just 
given, though it captures the intuitive idea behind the relation between 
thermodynamics and probability, strictly speaking involves an impossible 
operation: the quantitative comparison between infinite numbers. 
This is how Boltzmann actually proceeded in order to circumvent this 
difficulty: he first assumed that there is only a finite set of discrete energy 
values that each molecule can adopt, and only afterwards calculated the 
mathematical limits which result from infinitely increasing the number and 
“concentration” of discrete energy values. While this may be quite an ordinary 
mathematical procedure, it is important to see how Boltzmann himself 
commented on it in the paper: 
Even if this way of dealing with the problem seems to be very abstract at first sight, with most 
suchlike problems it leads the quickest way to the goal, and if one considers that all infinite in 
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nature never means anything other than a limit-transition, then one cannot at all conceive of the 
infinite variety of velocities that each molecule is capable of adopting in any other way, unless 
as the limiting case which occurs when each molecule can adopt more and more velocities.13 
As already mentioned above, the italicised expression is a phrase that he keeps 
on using into his late writings, where it is his slogan for the view that 
continuous equations presuppose atomistic conceptions which can then be 
conceived as indefinitely, but not infinitely fine-grained. For two reasons, I take 
the 1877 paper to confirm my reading that Boltzmann entertained the thought 
that atomism is indispensable to our understanding of the continuum as a 
serious element of his physical Weltbild, and not only as a rhetorical device. 
Firstly, it is obvious that the core of the idea, viz. that “all infinite in nature 
never means anything other than a limit-transition” is directly related to 
indispensable problem-solving techniques in his own concrete work as a 
theoretical physicist. Secondly, and more importantly, he had explicitly stated it 
long before he first engaged in philosophical and rhetorical battles with 
energeticists, mathematical phenomenologists and other anti-metaphysical 
opponents.14  
4. WHY DOES THE PHYSICAL CONTINUUM PRESUPPOSE A DISCONTINUOUS 
CONCEPTION? 
I shall therefore now turn to a major problem within Boltzmann’s 
indispensability considerations. As we have seen, he bases them on his 
conviction that continuous equations presuppose finite and discrete 
interpretations; in his words: that all infinite in nature can only be understood 
as a limit-transition. But this principle is itself not explicitly justified in the 1877 
paper, nor in most of the other places where it is invoked. Boltzmann almost 
seems to have thought it self-evident. Nevertheless, important motivating ideas 
for the principle can be found in Boltzmann’s philosophy, even if only in his 
later philosophical prose. In my opinion, two different lines of thought capable 
of serving as explanations for the aforementioned principle can be extracted 
from Boltzmann’s writing. For both these lines, the only place where they are 
elaborated is the above-mentioned course on Natural Philosophy.  
The first of the two lines of reasoning starts in the fourth lecture with the 
following remark: 
It is self-evident that we cannot define the simplest concept, the concept of number, 
because we cannot resolve it into simpler concepts.15 
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As Boltzmann goes on to explain, the concept in question is, more precisely, 
that of the positive whole numbers. He sees it as basic and grounded in the 
practice of counting. How much of it is inherited, and how much learned, he 
finds hard to tell. In any case, we have acquired familiarity with the operations 
on positive whole numbers. It is only by our deliberate intent to extend the 
scope of these operations that we construct the other kinds of numbers: 
fractions as well as negative, irrational and imaginary numbers.16 Positive 
whole numbers, on the contrary, have through constant experience made their 
way into our “forms of thought”, which Boltzmann characterises as follows: 
... forms of thought, which have through outside influence developed in our brain, in 
our psyche, and these forms of thought have always led us to correct results; thereby 
they have become fixed forms of thought.17 
From this psychologistic position, it is only a very small step to the conclusion 
that since the experience of counting which informs our laws of thought is 
always a finite experience, only finite concepts can be completely understood 
by our thus conditioned minds. Boltzmann nowhere makes this step explicit. 
He does however, with reference to Bolzano, contend that the infinite is a 
paradoxical notion. The paradox has, according to Boltzmann, not been solved 
by Cantor and the set theorists, who have only  
... got used to it, they have only shown how the computational operations are to be 
arranged, so that one does not stumble over it, how one has to calculate in order to get 
around the paradoxes. 18 
I find it not too bold to round out this line of thought and give the following 
explanation: The concept of number, whether finite or infinite, is ultimately 
grounded in experience and in our laws of thought. And since our laws of 
thought have, through evolutionary aeons and throughout our individual 
experience, been informed by exclusively finite experiences, we can only 
understand the infinite in nature as a limit of increasing finite magnitudes. To 
our minds, the infinite as such remains an unfathomable paradox. 
The second line of reasoning in question is highly original. It is based on an 
old problem in theoretical mechanics. Boltzmann does not refer to any specific 
texts in connection with this problem, but only mentions the name of the 
Slovenian mathematician Georg von Vega. But it can be shown that the 
problem goes back at least to Leonard Euler’s Mechanica of 1736.19 It arises with 
a very simple mechanical setting: A point mass A is, out of relative rest, 
attracted to a centre of force S. But Euler calculated the path of A as a limiting 
case of the general form of motion governed by a single centre of force, elliptical 
motion. The small axis of the ellipse in Euler’s calculation becomes infinitely 
small, and the ellipse infinitely eccentric; therefore, one apsis of the ellipse 
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moves infinitely close to the focus at S. In the limiting case, A’s starting point 
and S form the end-points of a straight line. The result is that A will move 
toward S in a straight line, but upon arrival will be instantaneously reflected 
and move backwards toward the starting point. Euler accepted the result 
despite its counter-intuitive character. 
Just as an aside, note that also Euler himself saw the reason for the conflict 
between common sense and his calculation in our limited understanding of 
infinitary reasoning. Yet, in contrast to Boltzmann, he trusted in mathematics to 
compensate for a lack of intuitive understanding: 
Whatever may be, here one must trust in the calculation rather than in our judgement 
and declare that we do not deeply comprehend a leap if it occurs from the infinite to the 
finite.20 
(He mentions a leap from the infinite to the finite because, according to his 
calculation, A would momentarily acquire an infinite velocity at S.) 
Georg von Vega was not content with Euler’s result. His treatment of the 
case can be found in the third volume of his Lectures on Mathematics, first 
published in 1788.21 He rejects Euler’s calculation and simply calculates the 
motion of A on a straight line right through S by means of integration, starting 
from the inverse square force law. Vega himself is not really bothered that this 
law implies division by zero for the case when A passes S, but Boltzmann tacitly 
corrects Vega’s alternative treatment and introduces a tiny sphere around S 
where the force is suspended. 
Boltzmann describes this as a dilemma: If, in Euler’s calculation, the small 
axis becomes infinitely small, and, in Vega’s calculation, the sphere around S 
becomes infinitely small, then they are both treatments of the same setting, but 
with directly opposite results, and it becomes impossible to decide which is the 
correct one. For Boltzmann, the dilemma is due to the infinitary reasoning 
involved. By restricting oneself to finitary reasoning, one can resolve the 
dilemma into a matter of differing cases: If we assume the small axis to be 
extremely, but not infinitely small, then A will reverse its direction near S, 
describing an extremely eccentric elliptical motion around S. And if we assume a 
motion on a straight line and a very, but not infinitely small sphere around S 
where the force is suspended, then A will traverse S and move on in the same 
direction.  
In fact, if we never adopt anything infinite, if we only calculate with finite magnitudes that can 
be arbitrarily large, we never get to a contradiction. [...] But if A coincides with S and if 
Newton’s law is valid till coincidence, [...] then I enter into set theory, into the really infinite, 
into the ultimate number ω, and I encounter contradictions.22 
 10
This whole argument is concerned with such a specialised mechanical puzzle 
that one naturally doubts whether it can be intended as a serious general 
argument against infinitary reasoning about nature. But in Boltzmann’s own 
fragmentary notes for the lecture, he suggests just this: 
Vega. Collision [/thrust]: That is my proof that nature must be constructed atomistically. 
Not that nature must, but that we must think it thus, if we do not want to apply such 
absurd concepts as the ones from set theory, which lead to ambiguities.23 
Thus, for Boltzmann, as I understand him, the Euler Vega dilemma shows 
nothing but the following: Our ability to reach secure and unambiguous 
conclusions is limited to reasoning about finite magnitudes. But this is at the 
same time a limitation of our understanding, because  
... the purpose of thinking is to be able to unambiguously draw conclusions everywhere; 
therefore, we must seek to form our signs of speaking, writing and thinking in such a 
way, that we express ourselves unambiguously and understand ourselves 
unambiguously.24 
So, since we cannot unambiguously draw conclusions about the infinite as such, 
we cannot understand it. Therefore, we can not understand the infinite in 
nature, unless we conceive of it as a limit-transition. 
Is there a common idea behind the two lines of reasoning I have just been 
describing? I think so. Let me try to give an interpretation of how the diverse 
ideas of Boltzmann that I have presented so far belong together:  
While, for Boltzmann, the Euler Vega dilemma seems to constitute 
exemplary evidence that we cannot unambiguously apply infinitary reasoning 
to nature, his psychologistic considerations about numbers may provide an 
explanation why this is the case. Numbers, being indefinable and basic forms of 
thought, have their justification in our and our ancestors’ regular experience 
with physical objects. This is why we can securely apply finitary mathematics to 
nature. Infinitary mathematics, on the contrary, is the extension of the laws of 
thought to a realm far beyond the experience that first established them. And 
while this may be tolerable as a mere game with concepts, by reapplying this 
extended mathematics to nature, our judgement becomes ambiguous and 
fallible. To apply a phrase which Boltzmann often used: The laws of thought 
overshoot the mark. And since our ability to unambiguously draw conclusions 
is a prerequisite for understanding, we cannot truly understand the concept of 
an infinitely divisible continuum. Thus, an atomist interpretation of the 
continuum becomes indispensable to our understanding. 
This is, of course, just an interpretation, though I have tried to stick as 
closely as possible to Boltzmann’s own statements. Boltzmann himself often 
only hints at the connections between his diverse ideas. Furthermore, some 
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central parts of these ideas, like e.g. the border between finitary and infinitary 
reasoning, are far from clear. 
But these uncertainties notwithstanding, one thing should have become 
obvious: for Boltzmann, whether or not to adopt an atomistic understanding of 
nature is not a matter of free choice, to be decided by criteria of usefulness. 
There are serious constraints to our choice. Against the Kantian spirit prevailing 
among his contemporaries, Boltzmann conceives of these constraints as 
grounded in naturalistically understood laws of thought. 
5. CONCLUSION: LIMITS OF PSYCHOLOGISM 
The reader may have already stumbled over a caveat in one of the citations 
given above: Boltzmann claims to demonstrate not that nature must be 
constituted atomistically, but “that we must think it thus”. This, I think, reflects 
Boltzmann’s acknowledgement (at least in 1903), that his mathematical 
argument falls short of a case for realism about atoms. 
As I have reconstructed the argument, the fact that our capacity to 
unambiguously draw conclusions is limited to the finite is rooted in our laws of 
thought. But laws of thought, even if conceived as conditioned by our 
evolutionary history, need not reflect the true constitution of nature. Thus the 
claim that an atomistic conception of nature is an indispensable precondition 
for an unambiguously founded science does not imply that nature must be 
discontinuous. 
Boltzmann was well aware that the laws of thought he imagined need not 
be perfectly adapted to promoting our cognition of the truths of nature. He 
thought of them as a kind of naturalist version of the a priori, but without the 
necessity, as the following remark indicates: 
One can call these laws of thought a priori because through many thousands of years of 
our species’ experience they have become innate to the individual, but it seems to be no 
more than a logical howler of Kant’s to infer their infallibility in all cases.25 
On the contrary, Boltzmann suspected that evolution often favours features that 
are useful in some cases and then become so deeply entrenched in the 
organism’s biological constitution that they cannot be given up if they turn out 
not to be appropriate in all circumstances. 
This happens especially often with mental habits and becomes a source of apparent 
contradictions between the laws of thought and the world, and between those laws 
themselves.26 
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This shows that according to Boltzmann’s own conception of laws of thought, 
they cannot be seen as reliably mirroring the nature that selected them; and the 
mathematical argument for atomism, in so far as it rests on the requirements 
posed by our laws of thought, cannot establish that this nature must really be 
constituted atomistically. 
To be sure, the mathematical argument was not Boltzmann’s only strategy 
for defending atomism. The main alternative is, of course, to present 
independent predictive and explanatory successes of the atomistic hypothesis. 
Today, this is often seen as the most promising argumentative strategy for 
scientific realism,27 and there are places where Boltzmann rests his case solely 
on this line of reasoning.28 However, in his later writings, he seems to have 
given preference to the mathematical argument. In the St. Louis address, he 
does indeed specify some explanatory successes of atomism, but then goes on 
to claim:  
However, it is not all these facts and the consequences drawn from them that I wish to 
put forward here, for they cannot resolve the question as to the limited or infinite 
divisibility of matter. [...] Rather, we will [...] examine the formation of concepts itself in 
as unprejudiced a way as possible [...].29 
The statement is then followed by a short version of the mathematical 
argument. The citation shows that, though Boltzmann did realise that the 
mathematical argument was not the only possible case for atomism in physics, 
he considered it the strongest one, at least in his later years. And to the extent 
that the mathematical argument was Boltzmann’s strategy for propagating 
atomism, his campaign cannot have been one for the reality of atoms. The 
argument as I have reconstructed it suggests that he was concerned with the 
secure and unambiguous foundations of physics rather than with scientific 
realism. 
As a conclusion, I would like to stress once more that the textual evidence 
shows perspicuously that for Boltzmann, the constraints of our laws of thought 
were serious and inevitable. Therefore, the limitations of his naturalistic (or 
more precisely, psychologistic) reasoning as presented in this section must not 
be confused with an alleged problem-shift from “Do atoms exist?” to “Is 
atomism as a mental picture fruitful as the hard core of a scientific research 
programme?” as diagnosed by Yehuda Elkana.30 On the contrary, the atomistic 
conception is presented as indispensable (albeit in a psychological way) and not 
a question of pragmatic choice. Though naturalism and pragmatism have 
sometimes gone hand in hand in the history of philosophy, they did not do so 
in the philosophy of Ludwig Boltzmann—at least not in his defence of atomism, 
as I have intended to show in this paper. 
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